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tIHIfigflKIWHMfflAI MBS IT MSArt?
On November Artb, 1900, Ronald Reagan was alsctsd ths ^Oth 
Prasldsnt of tho Unitod States, Ho rscsivsd an overwhelming 
U09 electoral votes, one of the largest vote totals in history*
This margin of victory has inspired ideas of new majority 
coalitions, ideological choices and mandates, I will argue 
that there has been no coalitional shift that would create a 
stable Republican majority, and that there has been no clear 
ideological choice in favor of Reagan's policies, but that 
dissatisfaction over Jimmy Carter's performance was the principal 
reason why Reagan was elected,
Ronald Reagan received 51 Jf of the popular vote, to Jimmy 
Carter's 4l£, Given that a victory of this site is not meaningless 
we can Interpret its meaning in two waysi retrospectively or 
prospectively. That is, we can consider the vote a reflection 
on the last four years or a prediction for the next four years.
My contention is that the vote in 1980 was retrospective, and 
that no prospective implications can be attached to it. In 
other words, it. was a vote, against c arter, i)©tfer- Reagan.
A prospective explanation for such a large victory might 
be that the electorste has simply made a clear choice. Such 
a line of reasoning would hold that the people had sised up 
the issue stances of the two parties and their candidates, 
choosen a winner, and thus voted a mandate. An explanation of 
this sort might be stated as follows«
The emerging Republican majority spoke clearly 
(in the last election) for a shift away from the 
sociological jurisprudence, moral permisiveness,
3experimental residential* welfare and educational 
programing and maaaiva federal spending by which 
the liberal (mostly Democratic) Establishment sought 
to propogate liberal institutions and ideology*
The above analysis was provided by Kevin P* phillips in
2
1969, in explanation of the Republican victory in 1968.
Mr* Phillips was willing to infer several things based on 
that election. First, he assumes that an emerging majority 
can be detected from a single election* Second* he believes 
that a single election can represent a clear choice* Third* 
he implies that voting in presidential elections is directly 
related to isssues such as supreme court decisions and congressional 
policies* I intend to assert that none of the above notions 
can be applied to the 1980 election*
The evidence does not support the notion that a clear 
ideological statement has been made. There is also not much 
evidence to support the idea of an emerging Republican majority*
In the first section. I will show that the strengths of the 
Republican and Democratic coalitions were basically the same 
in 1980 as they have been for many years* The Republicans and 
the Democrats are still divided pretty much along the same 
lines that they were in the 1930's* Most of the changes that 
have occurred since then happened in the 1960's*
In the second section* I will look at the voting decision 
on an individual level* I will show that the political parties* 
although still a major factor* are of declining importance*
I will then show that individuals do take issue differences
*
into account, but that iaauc choice waa not the Boat prevalent 
reaeon for the vote. The aoet important factor waa dieeaproval 
over Jinny Carter’e job aa preaident. Votera were aore likely 
to vote baaed on their evaluation of Carter than for any other 
reaeon. The only nandate that Ronald Reagan hae is not to 
act too much like Jinny Carter.
PART ONE. COAIITIOMS AMD CRITICAL ELECTIONS
When analyzing elections, it la oftan difficult to think 
of tha alactorata as so many millions of individuals* It can 
oftan be vary useful to classify the electorate according to 
such things as race* income, geographical location, age, 
religion and other criteria. Often, members of a group defined 
by the above criteria will tend to vote alike. Certain groups 
will often vote for one party more than the other. By analysing 
which groups vote for which party, we can determine where each 
party draws its support from. When a number of cohesive groups 
tend to vote for the same party again and again, those groups 
are refered to as that party's coalition.
In part one, I will discuss the 1980 election in the context 
of groups and coalitions, I will argue that the 1980 election 
does not signify the emergence of a majority Republican coalition 
the strengths of the two coalitions are largely the same as 
they have been, with only minor movements. This is in keeping 
with the arguement that this election was only an evaluation 
of the past. An election where voters were choosing sides for 
the future would be characterized by a good deal of coalitional 
changes.
6Tht Ifatinr 9f crtttsal BIm s Im m
At times In our history, frost majorities hsvo voted 
tofothor. Sometimes. thoso asjoritos roprosont only s frost 
many divergent forces joined together for s aoaent in tine.
At other tiaesi however, asjorities are established based on 
solid bonds* Such asjorities are made to last* If the i960 
election signifies the'emergence of a new magefrity Republican 
coalition, then historians will look at the election of 1980 
as a critical election.
The theory of critical elections holds that there are 
certain points in history when the party coalitions undergo 
rapid shifts* These shifts will be major, and they will turn 
out to be permanent in nature* They will lead to restructured 
coalitions, and sometimes, although not always, to a major 
change in the balance of power between the parites*
A critical election must find its roots in an issue, or 
set of issues, which divides the public. Often this issue will 
be a social disaster such as a depression or a war* It aust 
be something that people will be willing to take sides on*
When the people take sides, they will not be divided along the 
same political lines that they were previously. The new issue 
will cut across party lines, and new lines will be drawn up on 
that basis. One major party will champion each side of the 
issue* The people will vote according to the new divisions, 
regardless of where they stood aaongst the old divisions*
The theory of critical elections makes several assumptions 
about the nature of elections in Aaerica. and about the American
7electorate. The assumptions go me followst Thero is a gap 
between the expectations of the cosaon people and the performance 
of those in government. That gap becomes larger as tiae goes 
by. That is, what people want and what govemaent does becoaes 
les*' and laps,similar. Government policy often has a tendency 
to become uniform and standardized. People's problems, on 
the other hand, change a great deal. The situation can be 
aggravated by emerging interests that government is not prepared 
to deal with, and by old and foimerly ignored interests that 
have gained new social prominence. The people will realize 
that the government has stagnated, while the times have moved 
on. The majority coalition will then break up. and a new one
h
will be formed by a champion who promises a brighter future.
The critical elections model takes for granted a certain 
rationality and realism on the part of the average voter, at 
least for certain moments in time. They must first recognize 
that things are not going their way. They must then correctly 
analyze the source of their troubles. After that, they must 
decide upon the optimal course of action. Finally, they must 
act as a group in order to affect the desired change. If all 
those things happen, there will be a critcal election.
There art several identifying characterises of a critical 
election. These can be used to help us know one when we see 
one. There will be an increase in ideological polarization.
This will begin within the parties. Normally, American 
political parties perform integration and aggregation of ideas, 
especially during the convention. This will not be the case 
in the year of a critical election. Instead, the conventions
swill be marked by in-fighting and power struggles. There will 
be competition and polarisation within the parties.^
Once each party has decided on a nominee, they will 
concentrate on the differences between the parties. Each 
party will champion an opposite point of view. In most election 
years, the issue stances of each major party candidate will
n
move closer together as election day draws near.' In the year 
of a critical election, this will not be the case. The two 
parties will be polarized) issue distances will increase. The 
masses will respond to the polarization and take sides. There 
will be unusually high levels of political interest and voter 
turnout. When the votes are counted and analyzed, it will be 
determined that there has boen a drastic departure from the 
voting patterns of the last several elections. A great many 
voters will have switched party allegiances. In the long run. 
it will be seen that these new allegiances wore not just 
temporary cross-overs, but were permanent. Thus, the voters 
will have realigned, and a critical election will have occurred.
If a critical election had occurred in 1980, then that 
election might signify an emerging Republican majority. The 
evidence, however, does not support the thesis that a critical 
election took place in 1980.
9Was There a Critical Ejection In 198P?
The two moot important points about critical oloctions 
are that they bring about a great change in the allegiances 
of the electorate, and that the change they bring about is 
long-term. It is impossible to tell whether the changes 
brought by the 1980 election will be permanent. There has 
been a change in the holders of power, but I will present 
evidence that the long-term loyalties of the electorate were 
not greatly altered in 1980.
The best method of determining whether the last election 
was a critical1election is to compare the identifying characteristics 
os a critical election with what actually happened. Such a 
comparison will refute the theory that a critical election 
took place in 1980.
The first characteristic of a critical election is 
polarization. This is supposed to begin within the parties.
The Democratic party saw itself split in two. Incumbent 
President Jimmy Carter won his party's nomination only after 
a long and hard fight v/ith Senator Kennedy. The Democratic 
primaries were a polarized struggle. The Republican primaries, 
on the other hand, were characterized by winnowing rather than 
polarization.
The idea of winnowing is simple. The ability to aquire 
resources will lead to initial success in the early primaries.
Early success will enhance one's ability to raise funds. There 
is a snowballing effect. The reverse is also true. When one 
loses in the early primaries, it becomes hard to win later.
10
Therefore, whoever can jump out to an early lead will continue 
to build moaentua, and broaden hia lead, while all of the other 
candidates drop off. The more candidates there are initially,
O
the faster this will happen. Ronald Reagan's winning of the 
Republican noaination in 1980 consisted of winnowing.
Winnowing and polarisation generally take place under 
different conditions. Winnowing will be more likely to occurr 
when thare are a large number of candidates, and there is no 
clear favorite. Polarization is more likely to happen when 
there are exactly two strong candidates. If there are other 
candidates in the race, they are net of the calliber of the 
two nain contenders. In a).set: of primaries characterised by 
winnowing, loyalties within the party will eventually all begin 
to flow in the same direction. When there is polarisation, 
loyalties will eventually flow in opposite directions. In a 
party that is divided, it is far more likely that eaoh side will 
choose their own candidate and polarise rather than^ohoose.the same 
candidate and winnow.
According to the theory, once each side has gotten their 
nominations over-with, polarisation between the parties will 
be extreme. The two parties are to take differing stands on 
the issues, and the people are supposed to respond to those 
differences by taking sides. It is hard to measure the differences 
between the parties, but it is easy to measure whether people 
took sides. For the most part, they did not.
In table 1.1, on page 11, I have listed some of the evidence 
from the 1980 ICPSR poll. These statistics indicate that the 
public was not polarized. Section A sumBarises the responses
TABLE 1.1
----------- LEVELS OF POLARIZATION IN 1980______________
Section A
Which w r t u m  be better able to handle our problems*
I.nflltioD Unemployment
13* Democrats 10*
29* Republicans 2 lfS
51% Same by both 55*
• 7% Don' t know 6%
Section B
Which party ara you cloaar to?
Republicans 28*
Democrats 31*
Neither hi*
Section C
Are you a supporter of one of the political partlea?
yes *+0%
no 60*
Section D
Db Partita.confuse the issues. provide a clear choice?
They confuse more 56*
Neutral 21*
They provide a choice 23*
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to two soperate question*, that naked. "Do you think inflation 
(unemployment) would be better handled by the Democrata. the 
Republican*, or about the eame by both?7 The reeulte show that 
more than half of the respondents did not think on* party could 
handle either situation better than the other* This is 
especially alarming in light of the fact that inflation was 
mentioned most often* and unemployment third most often* as 
our nation's most serious problem*10 This hints that the people 
do not see the parties as dissimilar on some of the most important 
issues* If the parties are similar* it is not because they 
are each receiving overwhelming support for being the way they 
are* Sections B and C attest to that*11
Section D summarises the responses to a question that 
states* "The parties do more to confuse the issues than to 
provide a clear choice on issues," Respondents are asked to 
rat* the statement from on* to seven* on* being disagree very 
strongly and seven being agree very strongly, 11 If they 
responded one, two or three, I listed them in the bottom 
category. If the response was five, six or seven, I listed 
them in the top category* A response of four was considered 
neutral. The results can be interpreted to mean that the parties 
actually are making polarization more difficult, by confusing 
the issues that the people would have taken sides based on.
This evidence effectively refutes the idea of a polarised 
electorate in I960,
There are also supposed to be increased levels of voter 
turnout, and interest in the campaign, at the time of a 
critical election. In 1980, only ikH of those eligible to
13
did so. This represents the fifth consecutive presidential 
election in which turnout has decreased. The 54* turnout is 
tfce\l.t third lowest percentage since the creation of the 
national party system in 1828.
There does not sees to be any great increase in the level 
of voter-interest either. Table 1.2. on page 14, shows 
evidence that interest in the 1980 election was low both 
relatively and absolutely. Section A is taken from a question 
in the 1980 IC P M  poll which asks the following question.
"Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns.
How about you? Would you say that you have been very much 
interested, somewhat interested or not much interested in
1Jl
the political campaign so far this year?" Section B was 
taker, from 2bft Changing American Voter to provide some historical 
perspective.^ Section C of table 1.2 list the responses to 
the question. "Generally speaking, would you say that you 
personally care a good deal about which party wins the presidential 
election this fall, or that you don't care very much which 
party wins?"*® The results show just how uninterested the 
public was with the last presidential election.
We ahve seen that with the exception of Edward Kennedy's 
challenge of Jimmy Carter, the identifying characteristics 
of a critical election bare little resemblence to the 
circumstances of the 1980 election. By these standards, 
no critical election occurred in 1980.
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TABUS 1.2
a y i t f  pg IHIBBBST IHB IgiOMSgTIffl
Section A
Historical levels of political Interact
1252 1036 1060 12& 1252 1972
very interested 37* 30* 38* 38* 39* 32*
not very interested 29* 31* 25* 25* 21* 27*
Section B
Levele of intereet in 1980 
very nuch interested 30£
eosewhat interested 
not very interested 26*
Section C
How Much do voo cere which party win*? 
cere a good deal yft
don't care very muoh kjfk
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Ar« In A Period Of Critical Reallanment?
A sort interesting suggestion than tha ona that aaya 
wa hava had a critical alactlon ia tha idea that wa ara in 
tha aidat of a pariod of critical realignment. Thia seems 
aora probabla than tha idaa of a critical election. It ia 
alao harder to verify.
Tha and raault of a critical realignment pariod ia tha 
aaaa aa that of a critical realigning electioni a new coalition 
of votera will be formed whioh may be large enough and atabla 
enough to win alactiona for many years to coma. Tha difference 
ia that during a critical realignment pariod thtc changes will 
be maaa gradual. Such a realignment period may take up to 
a decade to complete.
To say that a critical election has taken place in 1980 
is to 8ay that a sudden change has already taken place. To 
say that wejare in a period of realignment is to say that a 
major change is gradually taking place right now, and the i960 
election was only a part of that change.
Realignments occurred in the United States in the 1620's, 
the 1850's, the 1690's and the 1930's.1? Because of the lack 
of data available for those years, it is difficult to be certain 
whether those realignments were the products of sudden critical 
elections, or if they took shape more gradually. There is 
reason to believe that these changes represent realignment 
periods, and that actual critical elections are very rare.
There is considerable evidence presented in American
lfiVoter that voters squire an allegiance to a party early in life.
They also show evidence that a majority of votsrs nsvsr oross 
party linos In a prssidsntial election. ° If party allegiance 
amongst ostabllshsd votsrs Is fairly solid* thsn all now 
coalitions must bo bassd largely upon now voters* The voters 
entering the electorate would be the material available for 
new coalitions to be built with. The fact that new coalitions
must bo built from new voters would, in itself, limit the
20else of any such change in one election. The concepts of 
realignments being based on new voters and of voters sticking 
to a party once they choose one would explain why realignments 
never oecurr more frequently than once in a generation.
Seldom is the span between realignments much more than a 
generation.
The occurrence of realignments in this country have always 
coincided with an influx of new voters. The changing suffrage 
laws in the 1820's not only provided a wave of new voters, 
but drastically changed the nature of the electorate. The 
realignment in the 1890's was preceeded by the reinstatement 
of the Southern states in 1898. Again, net only were there 
new veters. but they were of a different type* The realignment 
in the lt)8's came after the extension of suffrage te women 
in the 1920's. and the continuing waves of lemigrants 
throughout the flrmt quarter of the century. Again. the 
nature ef the electorate was draatieally altered.** This night 
be considered evidence that realignments in cur history have 
rested upon one side attracting new voters. It dees net-seen 
that these realignments were based on the electorate Sod Sen it y 
deciding that the party out ef power could better save their
17
problems and switching allegiances. es the critical alactiena 
nodal night hara ua believe.
Another inportant point about critical raalignnanta ia 
thiai whereas there it uaually a change in the party in power, 
thia ia not alwaya the caaa. It is possible that after various 
portions of the population have changed allegiances» the 
relative strengths of the parties will have stayed the sane.
It is also possible that the party in power may eaerge from 
a realignment period stronger than it was. This was the case 
with the realignment of the 1890's, which solidified the 
Republican base of support. The Republican majority that 
elected Coolidge and Hoover in the 1920'a was not comprised 
of the same elements as the Republican majority that elected 
Linceln and Orant in the 1860's, but no stable Democratic 
majority coalition ever emerged between those two Republican 
coalitions.
More often in our history, a realignment has put a new 
party in power. The first two realignments in our history 
altered the strengths of the parties so much that in each 
case the party that had been in power (first the Federalists, 
then the Whigs) was utterly destroyed.^ The realignment 
that brought Franklin D. Roosevelt to power in 1932 has effected 
national elections ever since. I will look at that realignment 
in greater detail.
The electien ef 1932 is often given as an example of 
a critical electien. There ia considerable evidence that 1932 
wae Jwat the midpoint in a period of realignment that laated 
roughly from 1928 It 1934c it often 00# tki ora portrayod
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as a tine whan the voters suddenly real!tad that Roosevelt and 
his social walfare programs wart what was naadsd to aare the 
nation. Evidence presented in !b£ Chmglfig l8Hrl98B ▼•ter
shows that the increaae in Deaocratic identification was
2kgradual and long-term. This is illustrated toy graph 1.1, 
on page 19* The nation did not suddenly totesat Deaocratic in 
1932*
Perhaps the largest factor in the realignsant was the 
mobilisation of potential Deaocrtats who previously had not 
voted. Table 1.3, below,taken froa X M  Changing American Voter, 
illustrates this p o i n t . T h e  population had tilted towards the 
Democrats for many years. The key to success for the Democrats 
lied in getting people out to the polls.
TABLE 1.3
-------- Mg.frlUnU9n 9f tilt Ptjggfltl (1929-193$)_______
1920 1924 1928 1932 1936
Democratic voters 14* 16* 20* 26* 33*
potential Democrats not voting 34* 34* 32* 25* 20*
(percentage of the entire population)
Whatever the reasons for the realignment, th results are 
certain. By 1936, we had a population divided along class lines. 
The Democratic coalition of labor, social, othnic and religious 
minorities, and most other low income groups formed a large 
majority of those identifying with anything at all. ^  By 
1936, these divisions were permanent. The coalitions began to 
stabilise. Many wealthy voters switched to the Republican

party.2? Par instance, 50% af thaaa who had voted D— a'erdtic
in 1932. but wantod l t o . j f ^  
vatad Republican in 1936. 26
In a pariod af realignment ouch aa tha ana that occurred 
in thia country batwaon 1928 and 1936. tharo is a cartain typa 
af pelitoal cliaatai
Political conflict was aora intansa and harshar. 
tha difforanca batwaan tha partiaa widar and claarar 
') than at any tima in tha rseollaction of aoat votara.
Partisan opponants ware aora than just competitors 
for powert they ware tha snsay. Economic questions 
baoaaa issues of aorality. cast in terse of pood and 
evil, right and wrong. Little rooa was left for politieal 
independence, or neutrality. People had to decide 
where they stood, and with whoa. And they did.
Millions of now voters entering tha electorate had 
no doubt whioh party they adhered to. and aatablishad 
voters ware forced to reconsider their allegiance.
Most of those who joined, or changed parties in that 
pariod did so for life.2^
Tha above passage is aora than just a good description 
of what was going on in the thirties. It contains aany of 
tha identifying characterises of a pariod of critical realignment 
There is no quantitative method for checking whether we are 
in the aidst of a period of realignment. Aa with a critical 
election, one needs soae hindsight to evaluate a realignsant 
period. Discovering a realignment period would be harder than
21
di•covering • critical election• If wo had had a critical 
election, it would now bo over* If wo are in the midst of 
a realignment period, it would still be going on. I can attempt 
to measure whether we are in a realignment period the same way 
I checked for a critical election. I can compare the identifying 
characteristics with the circumstances of the day. Such a 
comparison will load me to the same conclusion I reached 
oarlior, that nothing is going on, I roach this same conclusion 
for many of tho seme reasons.
The atmosphere of intensity, the fooling that one must 
decide where one stands, these things are missing from today’s 
political climate. I have already discussed the low levels 
of interest and the lack of polarisation. Partisan opponents 
certainly are not the enemy. Section A of table 1.4 attests to 
t h a t . S i x t y  percent of the respondents could not think of 
anything they didn't like about each of the parties. Not 
only is the public not responding to the differences between 
tho parties, but as section B of table 1.4 shows, only 5&£ 
of thorn even recognise' that those differences e x i s t . S e c t i o n s  
C- and D deal with important economic questions.^ Economic 
questions are no longer "issues of morality, cast in terms of 
good and evil, right and wrong." They are no issues of apathy, 
cast in terms of "I don’t know" and "I don't care."
I have discussed how realignments are based on new voters.
In. 1980, the new voters voted about the same as the old voters.
Of those people who did not vote in 1976, 50£ voted for Reagan, 
and kyU voted for Carter. ^ Of those who had never voted in 
a presidential election before, 46£ voted for Reagan, and
22
TABLE 1.4
THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN 1920
X Section A
"Is there anything in particular that you... 
Lika about tha Don't lika about tho
yoa 51*
02___________m .
Doaooratic Party?" 
yoa 40*
02___________60*
Liko about tho Don't liko about tho
RtMftlican Pirty?w
yoa 37*
02__________ 63*
BiBottloin t o m ? "
yoa 40*
02________ 60*
Section B
Ara thara difference! in what tha aartioa atand for?
yoa 58*
no 34*
don't know 6*
Section C
Do you have an opinion on tho tax out? 
have opinion 64*
haven't thought about it 27* 
don't know 9*
Section D
Raduca unaaployiont at tho rlak of inoroaalna inflation or viao-voraa?
MMMi’ optliiioi
haven’t thought about .t auah 
don't tenon
59*
27*
These figures art r.ot aueh different35J< voted for Carter#^ 
froa the population ae a whole*
Whereas a oritioal election and a period of realignaent 
are different, they are made up of the sane basis ingredients* 
Perhaps a oritioal election requires a atroagsr^doeo eo Mice 
things happen faster* But each fuels itself on the sane thingsi 
intensity, polarisation and turnout. If there were noderate ' 
levels of eaoh, perhaps we oould say that there has been no 
oritioal eleotion, but naybe we are in a realignaent period.
The levels of the necessary ingredients are so low that the 
suggestion that we are in a realignaent period seens nearly 
as unlikely as the suggestion that we have had a critical election* 
If solid evidence of a critical election, or a period of 
realignaent, would have been found, this would have been a good 
argtsient against ay thesis* It could have neant that the populace 
was realigning based on a poaative choice for the present and 
the future. This evidence, however, was not found* This is 
supportive of ny view that only a retrospective evaluation has 
been nade, and that nothing has happened that would effect anyone's 
future loyalties and thus effect the coalitions* I will now 
turn to an analysis of the present state of the coalitions. I 
intend to show that the coalitions actually have not been effected.
Thus far, in examining the affaet of the 1980 election 
on tht party coalitIona, I have diacuaaad tha thaoriaa af 
oritioal alactiona and of realignment parioda. Thaaa art tha 
two noat widaly aceaptad thaoriaa of how coalitiona change* 1 
havt praaantad avidanca that naithar ara taking placa or hava 
takan placa.in i960. I will now examinethe~presaht'StAterff 
tha coaltiona* I will preshat altarnativa axplanationa for 
tha praaant state of tha coalitiona, Tha data will not load 
to a claar conclusion as to which of tha axplanationa ia 
corract, but it will claarly show that naithar tha strangths 
of tha coalitions, nor tha pattams of changa wara graatly altarad 
by tha 1980 alaction, Tha main point I wish to maka ia that 
thara has not boon a groat daal of changa*
Explanations of tha currant atata of party coalitiona 
gonarally fall into thraa catagoriaa, One says that wa hava 
already undergone realignment* Another says that wa ara in a 
prelude to a realignment* Tha third argues that both eoalitiene 
ara falling victim to a process of dealignment*
According to tha first explanation, tha coalitions 
realigned during tha 1980's* Tha net affect of tha realignment 
was to leave tha relative strengths of tha parties about 
tha same as they ware* Because of this, tha shift was largely 
ignored* Nevertheless, each side has gained and lost different 
segments of tha electorate, leaving both coalitions vary different 
than they wara twenty years ago* John Petroeik makes this 
argueaent in his book antitlad lartv Coalitiona
---- Tha P r m n t  Stit» Of Tha Coalitions_________________
It it the thesis of this book that tho party 
systoa has undergone a major realignment oror tho 
past ton or fiftoon yoars. Its contours aro not 
as gross as expected, and for that reason tho change 
has b o m  aisidontifiod and ovon overlooked.^*
Gerald Poaper also argues that there has boon a realignment* 
but ho gives a different version of what happened* Poaper 
wrote in 1972 that a critical election had taken place in 
I96k,^ If either Poaper or Petrocik is correct* then we 
would expect the shifting to be over by now. Historically* 
realignaents have always been about thirty years apart*
Therefore* if there was realignsent in the sixties* we would 
expeet the cealitiene to reaein fairly stable in the eighties.
An alternative explanation le that ve are in a prelude 
period* This explanation eeye that both party oealitieno 
are breaking apart* This ie what account,e far the high nunber 
of voters who olaesify theaselvee ae independents today* if 
this explanation is true* then the trend towarde the center 
will soon be reversed* and polarisation will begin* Peeple 
will soon choose up sides along lines and based on Issues which 
have not yet become apparent* When the polarisation takes place 
the prelude will be over* A period of realignment* or a critical 
eleotion will follow.
Another explanation of the present state of the coalitions
is that we are in the aidat of a long-term trend of dealignaent* 
This would be due to a lack of support for either party or
for the party system in general. This view holds that people
Hcontinues to become indopondont because naithor party can 
offor them viable solutions to their problems. The parties 
have beooae too similar and too ineffective.
If ay thesis is files, and the 1980 election did represent 
a clear choice for the future with long-tern coalltional 
implications, then it is doubtful that any of the three 
explanations could be true. If there was a realignment in 
the sixties, then it is unlikely that another one would occur 
this soon. Although periodicity is not a part of the theory of 
critieal elections, there has been a set pattern of one occurring 
every thirty to fourty years. If there was a realignment in 
tho sixties, and if we assune that the pattern will hold, then 
we would new be in a period of stabilisation, with few new 
choices being made. If we were in a prelude, then the 
coalitions would currently be in a state of decay. The new 
issues upon which the new realignment would be built would not 
yet have surfaced. There would be nothing substantial enough 
for voters to make choices about. If we are simply going 
throv^h dealignment, then realignment at the same time would 
be impossible. If it is true that neither party can offer 
viable solutions, then it is safe to say that the electerate 
ceeld net make a clear choice in favor of one of the parties.
The sum of all of this is that support fer any ons of tho throo 
alternative explanations ia support for my thesis, because all 
of tho throo arc incompatible with the negation of my thesis.
Suppose wo examine these altematitiveo. Tho simplest 
method of determining who is in which coalition ia to look 
at tho vote itself* Robert Axelrod has diviaed an oxcollont 
method for determining tho contibution m segment of tho electorate
aakes to a party*a voto total. Ho aultiplies tho also of tho 
group, tho group turnout, and tho group loyalty to tho party, 
than divides by tho national turnout tiao tho national loyalty 
to that party. Ho thon arrivoo at tho group'a contribution.
Tho contribution roproaonta tho proportion of that party*a
t
voto that cano fren that group. Tho aua of all tho contribution 
will not add up to 100£, ainco tho groupa uaod aro both non- 
oxhauativo and overlapping. Table 1.5 is a reproduction 
of Axelfod's nuaerical breakdown of tho Democratic coalition 
for ovary proaidontial election sines 1952. Table 1.6 gives 
tho Republican version of tho aaao. Sons good points about 
Axelrod's method aro that it allows one to trace tho relative 
laportance of a group across tiao. and it gives one a chance 
to see how tho changes have cone about.
Wo can see that the largest contribution to tho Deatecretic 
voto is aade by tho South. Thoir percent contribution has 
neatly doubled since 1952. A closer look shows that tho increase 
is duo to the increased site of the Southern electorate and 
greatly increased turnout in the region. Tho loyalty of tho 
South has fallen off over the years. This points out a aajor 
flaw in Axelrod's aethod. A large group that votes in good 
nuabors aay bo a largo percentage contributor to tho party even 
while that group votes for that party less often. Recognising 
this. Axelrod includes a table of percentage deviation. We 
see by looking at that table that the South has tilted towards 
the Republicans in three of the last five elections. Thus, 
oven though the South's contribution to the Deaocratic vote has 
been steadily growing, the South cannot be considered a meaber 
of tho Deaocr atic walition if we use who they v for as the
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standard*
Ws can sst that the aost meaningful gain ths Dsaoerats 
have aads over ths last thirty years has been with ths blacks* 
Thsir layalty to the Dsaoerats has always bssn overwhelming.
In aggregate* blacks voted Denocratic at a rate of 56^  in the 
fifties* During the seventies* blacks voted Deaocratic at a 
rate of 77Jt.^ ® The figure for the eighties aay be even higher*
In 1980* with increased site and turnout* they contributed 
over one fifth of the Deaocratic vote. It is significant that 
the blacks are one of the only groups in either coalition that 
has run counter to the national trend of dwindling turnout.
The percentage contributions of the poor and those in the 
central cities have both fallen off sharply. A close inspectlen 
of the data will show that these two groups represent the opposite 
situation froa that of the South. Their peroontage contributions 
have decreased because the else and turnout of the groups 
have decreased* A glance at the percentage deviation in loyalty 
table will show that both of these groups have gone froa close-to- 
neutral to extreaely Deaocratic. Thus* these two groups can 
be considered a part of the Deaooratic coalition* even though 
their contributions are auch saaller than that of the South.
This shows again that the Axelrod aethod* although useful* can 
be deceptive.
Table 1.6, whioh is Axelrod's version of the Republican 
coalition* is auch less inforaative. Look at the contribution 
of the non-poor. Over the years, that contribution has steadily 
increased* froa 75^ to 99^. This seeas significant, however 
a look at the percentage deviation in loyalty table will show
that tha non-peer hare retml^d a virtually neutral group throughout 
The roat of the table la just as uninteresting*
Axelrod's data shows that each parties rotes in i960 ease 
froa about the saue sources as their votes in 1976 had ceae 
froa. This is consistent with ay point that there was not such 
change in the coalitional structures in i960. We can see that 
the decline in turnout has been unifora throughout nearly all 
segaents of the population* Although the coalitions are Bade 
up of the saae eleaents proportionately as they were four years 
ago. they are shrinking. This is support for the decline of 
parties. It is sharply contrary to the idea of the voters 
realigning based on new ideas.
Axelrod uses the vote as his standard of aeasureaent in 
describing party coalitions. Many others feel that a person's 
long-tern psychological ties with a party are aore iaportant 
than the way he votes in a specific election. The rational is 
that a person who is a supporter of one party night still vote 
for the other party at tines. For exaaple. suppose we have a 
nan who has always considered hiaself a Republican, and who has 
votod Republican in five of the last six elections, but who voted 
for Johnson in 196k• An Axelrod-type analysis of that voter 
would register hia as having switched froa a Republican to t.
Deaocrat and then back again. An analysis of his psychological 
ties would have hia as a Republican the entire tine* When 
discussing the effects of realignaents and coalitions, which 
are .long-tern in nature, it might be more accurate to classify 
that man as a Republican, rather than as someone who has switched 
parties twice.
There is considerable evidenoe to support th* idea that 
party prsfarsnet is aers stable than the presidential rote*
Party affiliations are formed aeoording to the ieaaea of the day 
when one is entering the electorate. This attachment will survive 
long after those issues are no longer important, regardless of 
what new ieeues might arrive.-^ Two thirds of the electorate 
still identify with the party of the first presidential candidate 
that they voted for. and a majority of them have never voted for 
the other party in a presidential election. As a person goto
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older, his partisan views seem to solidify.
This is not to say that party preference polls are a perfect 
indicator. The authors of The Chansins American Voter, while 
agreeing that party identification is stable, do not believe that 
it is as reliable a guide to the actual vote as it was when 
the: Alidfilfi Voter studies were done. It is not even certain 
that party identification is stable. Morris Piorina reports 
that ten to fifteen percent of the electorate will shift positions 
on a 3-way soale (Democrat-Independent-Republican) every two 
years. On a seven-way scale, the figure is fourty percent every 
two years. ®
Despite the fact that party preference pells are net a 
perfect indicator.there is still reason to believe that the 
coalitions can be better understood through party preference than 
through the actual vote. If nothing else, party preference is 
considerably different than the actual vote by nature. Therefore, 
before I can draw the conclusion that the 1980 election has not 
brought about any changes in the state of the coalitions. I 
nust also alyse the present state of the coalitions according 
to party it ntifieatien.
The party identification in 1980 for tha nation aa a whole, 
aa measured by tho ICP8R poll was fourty poreont Democratic, 
thirty throo poreont independent and twenty four percent Republican, 
Tho evolution of national party idontifioation can bo tracod on 
graph number 1.1, on pago 19* Wo can oboetrve that party 
idontifioation hao remained fairly atablo over tho loot throo 
proaidontial elections, We seem to bo in tho midet of a period 
of stabilisation, similar to tho period from 1936 to 1948.
Looking at tho figures for tho last twonty years, wo see - 
ovidonoo for tho theory that a realignment took place during 
tho sixties, Tho election of 1964 does not seem to bo a critic,%1 
election. Although that election brought a groat deal of change, 
those ohangea do not seem to bo of a permanent nature, Tho 
entire period from I960 to 1972 shows groat volatility. This 
poriod may have boon a period of critical roalignmont, Tho 
fact that stabilisation has occurred from 1972 through 198- 
shows that those changes were of a long-term nature. The data 
for the last twenty years seems to sit well with the idea that 
we have undergone realignment in the sixties.
Expanding our scope to the entire sixty year period covered 
by graph 1,1, we see some striking evidence for the dealignment 
idea. The number of independents has risen steadily across 
the entire period. In only two of the last sixteen presidential 
elections was the percentage of independents less than in the 
previous election, 1980 was one of those two election years.
This may be a sign that the number of independents has leveled 
off. It also may be a function of the current period of stabilisation, 
-r -r.G£aph-A, i ? id evidence that the overall strenghts of the 
coalitions have remained virtually the sane in 1980, A look
at party identification by group will show that tho coalitions 
aro alao still aado up of tho sane groups*
A question asked in the 1980 ICPSR poll gives tho respondent 
a list of eighteen groups and asks hia(her) to pick tho group 
that he fools olosost to*^ In table 1*7* on page 35* I have 
divided tho respondents into tho groups which they felt closest 
to* and given a sunnary of their party identification by group*
"Leaning Denecratic" represents tho sun of those whoso party 
identification was Strong Oonocrat* Weak Democrat, or Independent 
Denocrat* The "Leaning Republican" category has been calculated 
similarly.
The actions of people who feel close to a group may be
a strong predictor for what tho group as a whole will do* This
relationship was first noted in tho AudfiAQ Voteri "Tho higher
the identification of the individual to tho group* tho higher
the probability that he will think and behaive in ways that
ltddistinguish members of his group from non-members." Thus* 
although table 1*7 does not include all members of the groups 
listed* it nay be representative of then.
Table 1*7 shews that the Democratic coalition of today 
is indeed different from the Democratic coalition of tho Roosevelt 
era*-The Democrats are still the party of the liberals* the 
labor unions and tho poor# but there have been gains and losses*
But these gains and loses were not the produot of tho 1980 
eleotion. Nearly all of the groups that have shifted their 
allegiances since the thirties started shifting sons tine ago.
Some of them have already stabilised in their new positions*
The current state of the coalitions* as analysed by party identification
TABU l.T
y$
Oroupa That T i l t  Damooratio
group Leaning Den. Ind.-Ind. Leaning Rob. Siaa in Sansle
LLbarala 100.0* 0 0 1.3*
Labor Uniona 100.0* 0 0 .7*
Blaeke 93.2* 5.1* 1.7 < it.3*
Enriro manta liata 66.6* 20.0* 11.1* 3.3*
Poor 65.9* 11.0* 6.3* 9.3*
Women 60.5* 17.3* 20.9* 6.0*
Xiepanics 58 .it* 16.7* 16.7* .9*
Southerorra' ° 57.1* It .8* 38.1* 1.5*
Oldar Paopla 56.9* 12.2* 28.7** 13.3*
Vhttaa 50.0* 15.9* 3b.1* 3.2*
Young Paopla it8.6* 12.8 * 36.7* 8.0*
Working Paopla 1»5.8* lit.lt* 38.1* -j-
Total"69*tf
Oroupa that tilt Republican
Qroup leaning Dan. Xml o*»Indf loaning Rap. n i n  hi 1— 1|
Gonaarvativoo 12.2* 7.3 * 76.1* 3.0*
Bualnaas Paopla 21.6* ii.6* 73.8* lt.8*
Moral Majority 7.7* 23.1* 69.3* 1.0*
EaANro/a 35.** 7.5* 52.8* 3.9*
Middle Olaaa
»
39.0* 12.3* iiB.it*
fotal*30.8*
Natat I t n i  raepoadaata, o aap rieli* .2 *  of tha aanpla, 
f a i t  oloaaat to  bl« baalnaaa. Ona waa a Strong Democrat, 
ona a weak Danoorat and ona a Weak Republican.
%
is characterised by stability, net by chance.
It is no surprise to see liberals and labor ^ions heading 
the list of Oeaocratic supporters* We see again that the blacks 
are an inportant addition to the Deaocratic coalition* When 
analited by party identification of by vote, the blacks are now 
very solidly Oeaocratic. Hiapanies are also on the Oeaocratic 
side* This also should be no surprise* Those minorities that 
voted in the thirties generally voted Oeaocratic. The trend has 
never changed.
The fact that those who felt closest to whites are listed 
as tilting Oeaocratic should not be considered significant* Their 
percentage ie similar to that Of the nation as a whole.
The poor are still solid Deaocrats today, as they were in 
the days of Roosevelt. There are 59*60 aore of thea leaning 
towards the Deaocrats* This seeas to go hand-in-hand with 
Axelrod's finding of an enoraeus deviation in loyalty percentage*
Most of the aeabers of the Roosevelt coalition could be 
distinguished on the basis of having less wealth or lower social 
standing than their Republican counterparts* Sines the 1960's, 
the Deaocrats have added several groups that are not based on 
wealth or elass, but are instead proponents of specific causes* 
Although certain conservative, or reactionary groups have taken 
the Republican side, the Deaocrats have apparently enlisted sore 
voters through issue grays than the Republicans have* The 
enoraous tilt of the environmentallate towards the Deaeerats 
illustrates this point.
Although the Deaocrats have gained the support of many new 
groups, they have lost the support ef seas inportant eld groups*
The boi difficult group to intorprot froa table 1*? is 
working poopi* Although aore of then identified with the 
Deaocrats than with the Republicans, the percentage is very low 
for what is noraally considered a Democratic group* Perhaps 
the key lies in what the respondents perceive "working people” 
to mean* The large diffemce between labor union identifiers 
and working people suggests t M  these are perceived to aean two 
different things* A very large number of respondents, 17*4*, 
felt close to this group* It is possible that this group draws 
froa several different distinguishable groups*
According to the New York Tiaes poll, the Deaocrats got 
37# support froa the aanagerial-proffessional class, k?% support 
froa white cellar workers and **9>5% support froa blue cellar 
workers*^ An aggregate of these figures eight account for 
the h5*9£ support froa working people in the ICPSR poll. It is 
interesting that the figure of %9»$% support froa blue collar
kO
workers is down froa JIH In 1996* This seeas to be one area 
where there is change ocerring right new..
Another group that is no longer Deaocratic is the Southerners 
The South had been a Deaocratic stronghold even before the 
Rooeevelt realignment. As late as 1956, party identification 
in the South was heavily Democratic. In that year, the South 
was 67% Democratic, 16% Independent and 17% Republican^ In 
I960, party identification in the South was only slightly more 
Deaocratic than in the nation as a whole* This leads to the 
same conclusion that the Axelrod data lead to, that the South 
is no longer a solid part of the Democratic coalition.
On# explanation for the change in allegiance in the South 
is that aany people from the North have noved there in recent
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years. The authors of 1m  Changing American Vgjag looked 
deeper into the reasons for the decline of the Democratic South. 
They Isolated the party identification of native Southerners, 
and traced thea across time. They found that the decline of 
Democratic support in the region can be attributed to migration 
orly up to 1964. After that, the support for the Democrats 
declines amongst the Native Southerners as well. They conclude 
that the overall change in party iuentification would have been 
almost as great even if there was no migration.'’0
TABLE 1.8
PARTY IDENTIFICATION OF WHITE PROTESTANT SOUTHERNERS (1952-1972) 
1952 1956 j958 I960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1971 1221
Democrat 78* 69* 69* 61* 57* 64* 51** 50* 41* 4?*
Independent 13* 16* 1?* 21* 22* 21* 29* 37* 38* 35*
Republican_____9*_ 15* 14* 18* 22* 15* 17* 13* 21* 19*
Table 1.8 trace the party identification of white^Protestant 
Southerners. 1 Obviously, the South did not start becoming, 
similar to the rest of the nation in 1980. The process has been 
going on for a long time. The fact tht the South was only slightly 
more Democratic than the nation as a whole in 1980 rust be looked 
at as the continuation of a thirty•year-old trend, not as a response 
to choices presented in 1980.
Another group that was a member of the Roosevelt coalition 
but is not Democratic anymore is the farmers. Tha farmers had 
been strongly pro-Democratic since the price support laws were 
first introduced in the 1930's. This loyalty held into the sixties,
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TABLE 1.9
PARTY IDENTIFICATION OP FARMERS
1964 1980
Democrats 64# 2 6.5#
Independents 9# 33*9#'
RtttitfriiSMW__-  22*___ 35.8#
but hAs fallen off drastically since t h e n .  T a b l e  1.9 shows
that the fanners have gone from decidedly Democratic to decidedly
Republican.
The authors of the American Voter, writing when the
farmers were still solidly Democratic, noticed that those
from large farms were less likely to be Democrats than those
from small f a r m s . T h i s  is a good clue as to what has happened
since. Today, the farmer who is a sole proprietor and owns his
own land is a thing of the past. Farming has become big business.
This might account for the change in identification. When given
only a two party choice, those in the agriculture indistry
54
were 31# Democratic and 69# Republican. The changes in the farming 
industry obvioulsy didn't happen overnight in 1980. They are the 
result of an ongoing process that started in the sixties.
Along t h o s e  l i n e ! ; ,  t h e  fact that the farmers are now a Republican 
group has nothing to do with any choices made in I960.
I can summarise the present state of the coalitions ar 
f o l l o w s .  The Democratic coalition is still larger than its 
Republican counterpart. This.:point is net.'.mSdA?cteer in~the~ ' 
the presidential voting statistics, but it becomes apparent 
when looking at party identification. Many of the groups are
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still divided along class lines, as they wart in the thirties*
The Deaocrate are still the party of the poor, the labor unions 
and the liberals* They have been for the i.ast fifty years* The 
Republicans still have the allegiances of the wealthy, the 
businessaen and the conservatives. This, also, has been the case 
for $))§ last fifty years. The Denocratic strength has been increased 
through the addition of several groups that were not politically 
important until the sixties. These groups include blacks,’ 
environmentalists and women's rights groups. Meanwhile, some of 
the old Democratic groups are no icnger with them* The South 
now votes pretty much like the rest of the nation* The farmers 
are now a decidedly Republican force. All of these changes occurred 
between ten and twenty years ago.
There were no great surprises in seeing who lined up with 
who in 1980. Despite the wild oscillations in presidential vote 
totals, the allegiances of the groups are still largely the same. 
Just as the over-all party identification of the nation is 
stabilising, so is the identification of most groups,
What all this amounts to is that the 1980 election has not 
changed the long-term loyalties of the nation as a whole, or of 
its various segments. This should refute the thought that the 
vote in 1980 represents a permanent majority coalition.
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The Significance of Turnout and Mobilisation 
________________________To Coalitions____________________________
In the last section, I showed that the Deaooratio coalition 
is still considerably larger than the Republican coalition. One 
of the aain points of this paper is that the 1980 vote had 
nothing to do with long-tern party allegiances. The reason 
that the larger Democratic coalition is susceptible to losing 
for reasons having little do do with party allegiance is that 
not enough of its menbers vote. In 1980, the low turnout and 
the Democratic loss had a lot to do with each other.
The concepts of coalitions and mobilisation cannot be 
seperated. Coalitions are built through mobilisation. Only 
through turnout can a coalition be of any use. I have already 
discussed the prominent role of mobilisation in the building of 
the Roosevelt coalition. The fact that a lower rate of turnout 
has become a Republican advantage is no secret.
I don’t want everybody to vote. Our leverage 
in the election quite candidly goes up as the voting 
population goes down. We have no resposibility, 
moral or otherwise, to turn out our opposition. It’s 
important to turn out those who are with us.”
-Paul Weyrieh- 
Director of the Committee 
for the Survival of 
a Free congress
Fourty six percent of those eligible to vote in 1980 did 
not do so. A comparison between these people and those that
did vote will support ay clain that low turnout is a disadvantage 
for the Deaocrtaa. and that this was the case in I960.
One problem with studying non-voters is deteraining who 
they are. The percentage of respondents claiming to have voted 
is often auch higher than the actual turnout. In the i960 
ICPSR poll. 71 of the respondents claiaed to have voted.5”
In 1976. when turnout was only slightly higher than it was in 
1980. 82.5£ of the respondents claiaed to have voted. ^  In 
sstudying the non-voters. I will go on the assumption that 
those who actually adaitted not voting did not. I can only 
hope that the honest non-voters are a representative sample of 
all non-voters.
Table 1.10. on page 43, points out some of the differences 
between voters and non-voters. The party identification of non-voters 
is different than that of voters, as can be seen in Section k. 
Non-voters are far more frequently independents. Less of then 
support each of the parties. Non-voters are also more Democratic 
than are voters. There are 13.9+ more Democratic than Republican 
identifiers amongst the voters. For non-voters, there are 21.2£ 
more Democrats.
In Xht A-rle»n Voter, it was observed that turnout increases 
with the intensity of partisan preference, to 970 in the highest 
category.59 Section B of table 1.10 shows that this relationship
I
was still true in 1980, although the 97* figure could not be 
duplicated.^0
There are other ways to look at the differences between 
voters and non-voters that will suggest that low turnout is a 
disadvantage for the Democrats. Benjamin Ginsburg points out
TABLE 1.10
CHARACTERISTICS OP WOW-VOTERS
Section A
_____________Pmrtiamnahlp
Democrat independent Republican 
Vetera Ai.iiX 31. OX 27.5X
Non-votera 3A.9X AA.9X 13.7X
Section B
Strength of
Party ID X voting
Strong Republican 90.5X
Strong Deaocrat 8A.6X
Weak Republican 78.2X
Weak Democrat 67.0X
Independent-Republican 7A.3X
Independent-Democrat 6A.AX
Independent-Independent 51.5X
Section C
_________________ Repeat Non-votora-------------
voted didn't vote doea not
jjELJ22& in 1976 rWtiblT 
1980 votora 93»lX 
I960 non-votera A3 .AX
5.1#
A9.8X
1.9X
6.8X
that although partisan ldontifioation inoroaaoa turnout for both 
high and low lncoao groups, it ineroaoos turnout auoh aoro aaongst 
the low inooas groups,1 Moabers of low lncoao groups aro aoro 
likely to bo Democratic* Therefore, tho dscllno of partisan 
foolings in gsnoral is probably hooping hoao aoro potential 
Doaoeratic voters than potential Republicans.
Another factor in turnout is oducation. H n  Voter
states that tho strongest single predictor of turnout is oducation 
Ginsburg qualifies this* He does not deny the relationship, 
but ho says that lncoao plays a role in it* For those with a 
college education, turnout is high aaongst all incone groups*
For those with just a high school education, thoro is 780 turnout 
in the high income group, and 610 turnout in the low incone group. 
For those with an 8th grade education or less, turnout is 810 
in the high income groups, and 490 in the l o w e s t I f  those with 
less education and less incoae are aore likely to be Deaocrats, 
then again we reach the conclusion that nany potential Deaocrats 
are staying home.
Many of the points I have made about non-voters have been
dependent upon a survey question (did you vote?) that we know
many people lit* in response to. There is another method of
seperating out the non-voters. Those who are not registered
to vote cannot vote As table 1.11, on page 45 shows, there are
wide spread differences between those who were registered to
64vote and those who were not. These differences lead to the 
same conclusion. A groat many potential Deaocrats are staying
home rather than voting.
Turnout has become the great equalizer. The Republicans 
overcome their smaller numbers with greater turnout. Look back
*5
TABLE 1.11
CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WOT REGISTERED TO VOTE
Registsrsd Veters (710 of sample)
0 Carter U h i i d
most likely to vote (top 250) *7.10 52.90
middle group (middle 50)1) *9.90 5 0 .1 0
least likely to vote (bottom 250) 52.80 *7.20
Registered Voters (710) *9.*0 50.80
Wot registered____L22&1_______________— ____ SfbUg___ *0.80
at aactlon B of table 1.10, on page *3. Por ovary lovol of 
partisan intensity, more Republicans turned out than Democrats* 
As section C of table 1*10 show, there was a high correlation 
between voting in I960 and voting in 1976.(gammr of .86)^ 
There are a large number of citisena consistently not voting, 
and a lot of them are potential Democrats. If the Democratic 
party cannot find a way to mobilise them better than they did 
in 1980, then their advantages from a larger coalition with 
more Identifiers will be greatly diminished. The low turnout 
in 1980 allowed the election to be decided by factors further 
removed from partisanship.
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______ ________ Conclusions About Coalition._______________________
The evidence has supported ay claim that the 1980 election 
doaa not signify an oaarging Ropublican majority. I havs shown 
evidence that thara has baan no oritieal alaction, no raalignaant 
taking plaoa, and no ohanga in tha partisan loyaltias of tha 
nation as a whols, or of its various segments* Tha 1980 alaction 
doaa not saaa to hava affactad tha coalitions vary auch.
An examination of tha coalitions has found littla svidancs 
to support tha thaory of a proactiva ohoica being aada in 1980* 
Whan tha slactorats aakas a dacision based on now issues for tha 
future, it will line up according to tha different sides of 
those new issues* Whan the electorate is siaply asking a 
retroactive evaluation, it will vote based upon that evaluation. 
That evaluation, however, will not say auch about where the 
electorate stands as far as the future is concerned. Pew long 
tern loyalties will be changed,
I have presented evidence that the state of the coalitions 
have not changed, at least in recent years. Of the three 
explanations for the current state of the coalitions that I 
provided, I believe that the theory of a realignment during the 
sixties received the aost support. Many of the changes that 
have occurred in the coalitional bases happened, or at least 
began happening, during the sixties. The current laok of change 
in the coalitions could be explained as stabilisation after the 
realignment. The current period of calm could also be explained 
as a prelude to a new realignment. There has been no evidence 
to refute the theory that this is a prelude. There also is no
evidence to countar tha arguement that wa ara going through a 
long-tara praoaas of daalignaant. Tha faiiura of tha voters 
to aaka a choica between tha iaaua poaitons of tha two partiaa 
is in itaalff support for tha daalignaant claim.
Tha thraa altarnativa axpianations all have ona thing in 
common. They could all ha disproved by avidanca that tha public 
had baan willing to taka sidas and ehoosa a diraotion for tha 
future. Tha avidanca needed to disprove any of tha explanatJmts 
of tha currant state of tha coalitions also would have been 
supportive of the idea of a critical election or realignment, 
and also would disprove my thesis. But this avidanca was not 
present*
What tha avidanca does show is that tha voters ware not 
polarized* ware not willing to stand behind tha parties* did 
not really care about this election* and relatively speaking* 
didn'tieven show up for this election. Whether our currant 
state is to be considered stabilisation* prelude* or dealignment* 
my rain point is that whatever is going on* tha I960 election 
has not changed it. The state of tha coalitions* and all of 
the patterns effecting them* ware tha same in 1980 as thay had 
been before. No choice has baan made which would change them.
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PARI TWO
WHY DO WAY THEY DO?
In part one, I analyzed the election in terms of voting 
blocks and groups. It is difficult to study the actions of 
millions of people without breaking them into groups. This is 
especially true when members of groups tend to act alike, and 
the same groups tend to side with each other again and again. 
Although there are many things to be learned from the study of 
groups of voters, one must not lose sight of the individuals 
that make up the electorate. Nobody compels a voter to vote 
like other members of his race, occupation or area, and not 
all.voters, do. Each voter is free to make his own choice when 
he steps into the voting booth, On November 4rth, 1980, 42,951,145 
voters chose Ronald Reagan, enough to elect him President.
In part two, I will examine why so many individuals made that 
choice.
I have compiled a list of the ten most frequently mentioned
67reasons for voting for and against each major party candidate. ' 
'.'his is listed in table 2.1, on page 49. Many of the reasons 
listed are personal attributes. These may be legitimate reasons 
for making a decision, but they are very hard to measure. They 
depend entirely upon the individuals perception. For instance, 
honesty, or dishonesty, was a popular reason for voting for and 
against both candidates. Some of the reasons look ahead to the 
future. An example is the prediction that we will have a better 
chance for peace with Carter. These prospective reasons are 
outnumbered by the retrospective reasons, such as Carter hasn’t
TABLE 2.1
THE T9P Tfflt
Top Ton Reasons Por
Vising g«r ---
1 . Previous record in office
2. Strong military position
3. Better times under him 
4 . Will balance budget
5. Honest
6. Strong/decisive
7 . More conservative
8. Time for a change
9. Like his ideas
10« Like his economic policy
Top Ten Reasons For
1 «Has done a good job
2 . Honest
3. Has experience
if. Will have better chance 
for peace
5. Moral
6 . Good man
7 . Has bandied Iran well
8. will do a good job
9. Good for the country
1 0 . Should have second term
Top Ten Reasons Por 
yotina Assist Reagan_____
1 . Too old
2. Worse chance for peace
3 . Campaign speeches 
if. Previous occupation
5 . Impulsive
6. Dishonest
7. Bad man
S. Don't like his foriegn policy
9, Poorly informed
10. Inexperienced
Top Ten Reasons For 
Vatins Against Carter____
1 . Handled Iran poorly
2. Indecisive/weak
3. Less income during his term
if. Cost of living higher during hi
5. Won't do a good job
6. Hasn't kept his promises
7. Family
8. Don't like his foriegn policy
9 . Dishonest
10. Hasn’t got results
50
Table 2.1(A)
percentages from tabla 2.1
personal reaaona 40.00
issue-related reaaona 27.50
retrospective reasons 25.00
predictive reasons 12.50
general reaaona 5.00
campaign-related reaaona _____1>3L
kept his promises. Anothar group of roaaona doala with laauaa. 
Objection to their foriegn policiea waa a reason for voting 
againat both Carter and Reagan. It ia surprising that neither 
the Democratic nor the Republican party ia mentioned anywhere.
Table 2.1(A) summarises the percentagea for each type of 
reaaon. Some reaaona fell into more than one category. For 
inetance, Carter haa handled Iran well(poorly) ia both retroapeotive 
and isaue-related. It ia Intereating to note that out of the 
ten retroapeotive reaaona. six of them were reasons for voting 
againat Carter• and three of them were reaaona for voting for 
Carter. We will see that these retrospective evaluations played 
a very important role in determining the outcome of the eleotion.
In part two. I will look at which of the reasons for voting 
a certain way were the moat important in I960. In the first 
section. I will look at the role of .party identification.
Party identification waa not mentioned at all in table 2.1.
Although it is still a major factor in every election, the 
evidence will ahow that party identification was not as important 
in 1980 as it has been in previous years. It certainly waa not 
the decisive factor in 1980.
In the following section, I will look at voting based on 
issues and idoology. Tho data will ahow that thaaa faotora are 
of aoro iaportanea than thoy havo boon in pravioua years, hut 
nay havo boon a nuotral factor in 1980. In tho third section,
I will oxaaino voting baaad on ratroapoctivo evaluations. Tha 
data will support this as being tho aost important faotor. Tha 
evidence will lead to the concluaion that voting baaed on retroapective 
evaluation of iaauoa was the Boat important factor in 1980.
Isaue voting baaad on retroapective evaluations is issue 
voting as Jinny Carter's performance pertains to the issues. It 
haa nothing to do with Ronald Reagan's prone*, about the issues.
The Evidence that this was the B o a t prevale; pe of voting
will support my argueaent that no ideological choice between 
Reagan and Carter has been made.
Many people will vote for a candidate soloy on the basis 
of party. As wo have ooon, however, the Republican party has 
won three out of the last four presidential elections despite 
the fact that there are far sore Democrats. Therefore, the 
correlation between partisan and the vote cannot be one-to-one.
In I960, many people, voted in accordance with their party 
identification, but not enough to secure the victory for the 
Democrats.
There has been debate over just how important partisanship
is to the vote. The American Voter, written in i960, made the
strongest case for partisan identification being extremely
important to the vote. They observed a high correlation between
£8one’s party identification and that of his parents. They 
explained that an individual was likely to squire a party 
identification early in life, from the family, and keep it 
for good. Attachment to a party was said to increase as one 
got older. The stronger the attachment, the more likely one 
was to vote for the same party repeatedly• Por those who 
were less educated, the relationship between party identification 
and the vote was stronger.^1
Many authors who have written more recently have taken the 
view that the relationship between partisanship and the vote 
is not as strong as it was proported to be in The American Voter, 
and is getting weaker. The most convincing such arguement 
was presented in The Chancing American Voter. According to this 
work, fewer citisens have steady and strong psychological tie s  
with a party, and party affiliation is less of a guide to
REASONS FOR STRONG PARTISAN IDENTIFICATION
TABLE 2.2
Statement % of strong partisans
1* "Ever sines I can renenber, I've
always been a (Democrat/Republican)" 66f>
2. My parents were (Oemocrats/Republicans)
and I am too." 5 2 ^
3. "I an enthusiastic about what the
(Democrate/Republicans) stand fo r .M 5 8 ft
b .  " I  a l m o s t  a lw a y s  s u p p o r t  t h e
(Denocratic/Republican) candidates." 6(rf>
5 . "I really mean that I liked
(Jinny Carter/Ronald Reagan)
very much in the last election.* k2$
6. T i  a strong (Democrat/Republican)
because of the way I feel about
what Jinny Carter has been doing." •< Jbfi
electoral choice. Furthermore, parties are less frequently
used as standards of evaluation, and partisanship is less
72likely to be transferred from generation to generation.
The 1980 election study reveals some intersting things
about tho nature of partiaan identification. I have listod some 
of tho roaulta in table 2.2, on pace 5A. Tho Aaorioan Voter 
contention that two-thirds of the identifiers never croee party 
lines is verified by statenent four, The contention receives 
additonal support fron stateaent one. These stateaente are 
evidence that predictions of stable partisan identification 
hold true for about two-thirda of the strong partisan identifiers* 
Apparently* partisan identification ie actually a retrospective 
evaluation for the remaining third of the partisan identifiers, 
judging from statements five and eix.^ If this is true, then 
part of the correlation between partisanship and the vote is 
actually due to retrospective evaluations*
The data from the 1980 election shows that the correlation 
between partisanship and the vote was still fairly strong in I960* 
Partisanship was probably a bit stronger a predictor of the 
vote in 1980 than the authors of The chmnwltur American Voter 
would have thought. It was probably a bit weaker than the authors 
of The American Voter would have thought* Section A of table 
2.3, on page 56, shows the vote for eaoh level of partisan 
identification,^ Many facts are apparent. Party discipline 
was stronger amongst the Republicans than the Democrats* Strong 
identifiers stuck with the party more than did weak identifiers*
The man who carried the independents won* None of this should 
come as a surprise*
What is surprising is the similarity between the I960 table 
and the 1956 table, taken froa The Amerloan Voter. Although 
the number of independents has risen froa 23J* to 330 in the stretch 
of time between the two, those who still do identify with a
TABLE 2.3
PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND THE VOTE 
S«ctlon A
strong weak ind. ind. ind. weak strong
D-. Pern. Pern. ind# R*P« R«p . BfPi
Reagan 8.6* 30.8* 26.9* 62.5* 77.4* 82.4* 96.0*
Carter 88.2* 60.3* 50.5* 18 • 80 9.7* 8.1* 1.6* £1980)
Anderson 3.2* 8.9* 16.1* 15.0* 12.1* 7.4* 2.4*
strong weak ind. ind. ind. weak strong
D#bi> J&b- ind. R«p . RtBi 8p p.
Eisenhower 16* 37* ? 73* ? 93* 99* u r n
Stevenson 85* 63* ? 27* ? 7* 1*
Sactlon B
trtittT ir-V O ttn  U 2fiQJ _________ eromaovar voters (19S2-l9Bo;
Democrats 27* 1952 1956 I960 1964 1968 1972 1980
Rapublleans 10% 18* 17% 14* 17* 2** 2?% 20%
total 20%
Section C
Reagan Carter Anderson
Voted for Ford in 1976 80.2* 11 0 00 7.5*
Voted for Carter in 1976 26.3* 64.9* 8.1*
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party namrly as often.
Tho strong party discipline amongst the Republicans is more 
surprising when one considers that Ronald Reagan is not considered 
a aainstreaa Republican. U u  fikiasiflf Aaerioan Voter disousses 
the trend towards candidates being leos representative of the 
parties, now that they can run their own campaigns. Party 
activists are often further froa the cener than the party rank 
and file. The predicted result is that party members will be 
more oriented towards issues and particular candidates than 
towards the p a r t y . T h e  statistics speak against this claim.
Eighty percent of the Pord voters returned to vote for Reagan.
who had been Ford's opponent for nomination in 1976. The Democrats.
who had the same candidate, had just 65Jf of their 1976 voters
vote for them agian in 1980.^ The fact that so many of Ford's
voters voted for Ris old adversary. Reagan, along with the fact
that many of Jimmy Carter's 1976 voters did not vote for him
again, shows that party loyalty is situational. It is possible
that party loyalty and other factors persuaded some of those Republioans
who had not wanted to vote for Reagan in 1976 to do so in 1980.
It is also possible that other factors outwieghed party loyalty 
and persuaded Democrats who had voted for Carter in 1976 not 
to do so in 1980. There is evidence yet to be presented that 
the foremost amongst those other factors was a lack of satisfaction 
with Jimmy Carter.
For whatever reason, many Democrats voted Republican. Because 
of this, and because of low turnout, the Democratic advantage 
in number of partisan identifiers was reduced. In table 2.4, 
on page 58. I have attempted to show this relationship mathematically.
TABLE 2.4
B&nw 9F the emmii ms
% in this 
category
X
loyalty
X
to party turnout
* of voting 
iflmtiritra
Strong Democrat 16.2* X 88.2* X 84.6* > 12.1*
Weak Democrat 23*2% X 6 0 .3* x 6?.8* • 9.5*
21.6*
Strong Republican 9*6% X 96.1* X 90.5* ■ 8.8*
Weak Republican 13*7% X 82.4* X 78.2* « 8^5*
__ 12.3*
I have taken the percentage of the population that falls into
that category of partisan identification times the percentage
voting for the candidate of their prel'ered party times turnout
8oin that category. The result is an altered form of party
identification. It shows the percent of the electiorate that 
identified with a party and actually voted for that party. The 
two additional factors reduce the Democratic advantage considerably. 
The results of my calculations do not mean that 21.6* of the 
electorate actually voted Democratic based on party identification. 
This means that at most« 21,6% of the electorate could have 
voted Democratic based on party identification! and at most 
17.3* of the electorat could have voted Republican based on 
party identification.' Taking into consideration the evidence 
that up to one-third of party identification may be based on 
retrospective evaluations! the actual number of votes based on
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partisanship was probably much lowar than thaaa aaxlaum figures. 
Also, remember that ?1 % of the respondents claimed to have voted. 
The actual turnout was , This aeans that the actual percentage 
of partisan votes was even less.
Undoubtedly, there was sons voting in 1980 based on party 
alone, This provides a base of support for each of the parties.
I have shown that these bases of support might be much smaller, 
and closer to even in si se than party identification might 
indicate. It is not these relatively few predetermined votes 
that provided the large margin of victory for the Republicans, 
it was those voters who might have voted either way, but choose 
to vote Republican. I must, now examine why so many voters aade 
that choice ir 19?°.
It is ay contention that the 1980 election does not represent 
a choice between the issue positions of nonaid nuagan and 
Jimmy Carter# There was some issue voting pri;.,i.rit, but those 
who voted based on issue did not seem to favor one candidate 
over the other to any large extent# Issue voting seems to have 
been a neutral and only mildly important factor in the 1980 
election.
There has been debate as to whether or not the citizens 
do form ideologitn and vote based on issues. Some have said 
that the citizens are riot even capable of doing so i f  they wanted 
to. The same school of thought that states that people vote 
mainly due to party identification believes that issue voting 
i f  fairly infrequent. Again, the classic statement ofv<ene case 
is found in The American Voter. They devised a simple test for 
issue voting, and found that very few people could pass i t .
They reported that one-third cf the respondents were not familiar
8lwith a single issues Only twelve to fifteen percent of the 
electorate was credited with being able to form a coherent 
ideology and vote based on i t ,  " The book concludes with a 
rather harsh judgment of the average citizen* "The typical 
voter has only a modest understanding of the specific issues and may 
bg quite, ignorant of matters of public policy that more 
sophisticated individuals might regard as very pressing.
Other authors, such as Michael Margolis. have since agreed with 
this view.®^
Many other political scientists disagreed with theee findings.
_______ Effdcts of Issue Voting and Ideology__________ _ ___
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Among them was V.O. Key. who contended that "voters art not 
fools."®* Ho denied that tho olectorato waa "straightjacketed 
by socail determinants.” and said that they were as rational as
g<
one could expect. given the situation. •*
The reason for the lack of issue-voting in the years 
studied by The American Voter researchers was that there was 
a lack of issues and issue and issue differences for the public 
to respond to. As Gerald Pomper states. “Where there are 
perty positions and d i f f e n r u H  s ,  the voters can perceive them.
But. as Key observes. “Not every election generates group related 
ideas which drive a wedge through the electorate along linos easily 
identified by gross characteristics of the electorate.
Since the time when The American Voter was written, is ue voting 
and the number of people with concrete ideologies have both
i n c r e a s e d . T h e  reason for this is simply because of more
88exposure to politics, and differences.
The data from 1980 shows a moderately strong correlation 
between issue position and the vote in I960. Table 2.5. on page 
62. presents the vote by issue position for three of the more 
important issues of the campaign. For each issue, the respondent 
was asked where he would place himself on a scale from one to
A a
seven. 7 The highest percentage reached was 77.10 for Carter 
from those who wanted to reduce unemployment at the possible 
expense of inflation. Those who felt very strongly one way or 
another about any given issue generally tened to vote for Anderson 
less. There are fairly large differences between the major 
party candidates in the 1-2 .and 6 -7 ranges for every issue.
Reagan
Carter
Anderson
Reagan
Carter
Anderson
Reagan
Carter
Anderson
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TABLE 2.5
ISSUE POSITIONS AMD THE VOTE 
Section A
Defense Spending
Decrease Increase
1 2-.- . 3_ if _._5_ 6 1
13. OX 5 .3X 32. IX if2 . 6X 52. IX 65. 2X 61. 9X
65. 2X 84.2X 45. 3X 43. 9X 35. 5X 26. IX 33. 5X
13. OX 5 .3X 20. 8X 11. 5X io. IX 6. 3X if.lX
reduce Section B no r#^uc-tjon
1 £ 3 4 5 6 2 -
71. OX 84. 3X 68. 8X 51. 2* 41. 5X 29. 3X 24<2X
17.4X 7 .4X 21. 3X 38. 6X 44. JX 59. 3X 69. 7X
5. 8X 7 .4X 9 . 9X 8.4X 14. 2X 9 . 8X 9 . 5X
Government Services
Section C
Unemployment of Inflation 
reduce unemployment reduce inflation
first . first
1 2 1
22. 2X 30. 6X 44. 8X
77. 8X 59. 2X 45. 7X
0 8. 2X 9 . 5X
4 5 __
50. 2X 60. 4X 72.7X
39. 2X 22. 9X 14. 5X
8. 8X 14. 6X 10. 9X 3 . OX
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A simple way to think of candidate's idaologiaa is to label 
than left, cantar or right. Supposedly, whan there are two eenter 
candidates, there will be a close election. This was the ease 
in I960. 1968 and 1976. When there is a center vs. left, like 
in 19 7 2. or a center vs. right, as in 1964. the election is not 
supposed to be dose. The public will respond to the issue 
differences and the center candidate will benefit. Many voters 
will leave the party of the outlying candidate in order 
to vote their issue positions. ®
•The conclusion r.eemr o b v io u s  1 if you want to win, nominate 
a candidate close to the center. Or, if you must nominate a 
candidate far from center, hope that the other party does so 
ss well.” After stating the seemingly obvious, the authors 
of She Changing American Voter caution that they hesitate to
draw that conclusion, because there are "several different ways
91to lose an election,of Which issue extremity i s  Just one.
If Carter is in the center, and Reagan is on the right, 
then why didn't Carter win? A closer look into the matter reveals 
some answers.
To label a candidate right, center or left is a gross 
oversimplification. On a seven point scale (extremely liberal, 
liberal’, somewhat liberal, moderate, somewhat conservative, 
conservative, extremely conservative) Carter is generally regasded
«• a
as a moderate, and Reagan a conservative. Moderate and conservative, 
however, are relative terms. The candidates are whatever the 
electorate thinks they are in relation to themselves. Therefore, 
the best way to find out what they really are is to ask the 
public. In a survoy question that asked respondents to perform 
just such a rating, the modal figures were 6 (conservative)
6k
TABLE 2,6
IDEOLOGY AND ISSUE POSITION 
OF THE CANDIDATES AND TWt PUBLIC 
Section A
1_________ 2
Extremely
Liberal
Carter
3.7^,
C„  ^ ,.f.. 
k, 33 
Public
Reagan
5.21
,5,R. £________ Z
E x t r e m e l y _ 
C o n s e r v a t i v e
Section B
Defenae Spending
Carter
3.73
Reagan
5.50
Greatly
Decrease
— ...— - 3 .. , -  1  ■ A. — -
5.21
Public
------------ ^
Greatly
Increase
Section C
Governaent Servicea
2 _ 3
Reagan Carter 
3.^3 5.00 
R k P 9 6 7
Reduoe 
Spending
C 3 7
Public NO
Reduction
• Section D
Inflation or Uneanlovaent
1 1 _____ _____________1
Reagan Carter 
3.66 4.35 
R kt C 5 6 7
Reduce
Inflation
Public Reduce
Uneaployaent
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for Reagan and Mmoderate) for Garter, with tho public alao 
rating itaolf a 2 Whan ona takes an arithnetic average of 
the ratings, howevsr, it becomes apparent that Carter is not 
that mush closer to the center than was Reagan. The results 
of such averaging are shown pictorially and numerically in 
Section A of table 2*6* I found the results so interesting that 
I performed the same test for the three issues 1 had previously 
dealt with in table 2*5* Carter was only a bit closer to the 
public midpoint on two of the three issue, and on the third 
he was quite a bit further away.
Of course, these are not necessarily Reagan and Carter's 
real issue positions, but that is not important* Voters do not 
vote based on the candidates' real positions, they vote based 
on their perceptions of those positions* The bottom line is 
that Carter's position and Reagan's position each seemed about 
the same distance away to the public.
Carter and Reagan are not close togethor on any of the 
issues measured. Their distance from each other was apparently 
enough to bring out some of the issue voting evidenced in table 
2*4. Since Carter was only slightly closer to the public than 
Reagan was, however, he probably derived only a small benefit 
from issue-related voting* The reasons for voting for Carter 
based on issue apparently were not enough to overcome the other 
more decisive reasons for voting against him. In the next 
section, I will finally get to just What those decisive reasons
were*
oo
__________ voting Baaed On Retrospective Evaluations_______________
"The volet of tho pooplo is but an echo."
-V.O. Koy
Thor# is s school of thought amongst those who study elections 
that voting is simply a matter of approval or disapproval of 
the incumbents job during his term in office* Voters respond 
to the conditions they are given* If they are generally satisfied 
with the way things have been over the last four years* they 
will return the incumbent president* or the candidate of his 
party* for another term* If they are displeaee&* they will 
throw him out* It is my argument that the voters were not 
happy with the job Jimmy Carter had done as president* This 
is the main reason that he no longer has that job*
The first theory of retrospective voting is generally 
credited to Anthony Downs.*2 Downs based his theory of voting 
behaivior on two precepts* The first is that voters act rationally* 
in their own best interest. The second is that they vote for 
which ever party they expect higher utility from. Downs sought 
to provide an explanation for exactly how a rational voter 
calculates which party he will derive a greater utility fromi 
Since one of the competing parties is already 
in power* its performance (since t h e  l a s t  election) 
gives him (the voter) the last possible idea of what 
it will do in the future* assuming its p o l i c i e s  have 
some continuity. But it would be  i r r a t i o n a l  t o  
compare the current performance of one party wi^h 
t h e  e x p e c t e d  f u t u r e  performance of another. F o r  a 
valid comparison* b o t h  p e r f o r m a n c e s  must take place
under the asm* condition*. i.*..in th* n a t  tiao period* 
Therefore the voter must wiegh the performance that the 
opposition would have produced if it had bean in power. ^
Two ideaa that are inherent in Down's theory are that of 
party continuity and party accountability. The first idea ia 
siaply the belief that a party will act in the future in a manner 
similar to how it has acted in the past* The second notion is 
that the party in power ia entitled to the credit* or the blame* 
for the actions of ita members, even if the same people are not 
seeking reelection.
When times are good* there is very little that a challenger 
can do. As V.O. Key states "...the electorate responds most 
markedly and most clearly to those events it has experienced
Ok
and observed* vicariously or directly."7^ The voter will never 
trade a solid record for a premise. On the other hand* when 
things are not going so well* the reality of the bad times 
speaks largely for itself. All the challenger need do ia make 
sure he blames the incumbent f o r  th e  s t a t e  o f  t h i n g s .
Over the years* certain candidates have tried to play off 
>f the notion of party accountability* and others have tried to 
avoid it. Those trying to avoid it are rarely successful. For 
exes pie* Lyndon Johnson made all of the references to JFK that 
he possibly could in 1964. Gerald Ford tried hard never to mention 
anything th >t had e v e r  happened before 1 9 7 ^ ,  but nobody had 
forgotter .
Section A f table 2.7 urtratee the point that Hubert 
Humphrey was helc a countable for the actions of Johnson.
TABLE 2.?
Section A Section B
Evaluation of Johnson' 
Handling of Problems
(1968)
poop fair £££4
str. Dea 40# ii# 5#
wssk Den 70% 34# 23#
ind. Dea 83% 42# 23#
independ. 100% 74# 45#
ind. Rep 100# 91# 100#
weak Rep 92% 89# 87#
str* Rep 25#— -25#
# voting for 
Nixon
2f£ilfin_£
Evaluation of Carter's 
Handling of his job
(1980)
a p a r w  disapprove . 
Rsagan *•**># 71.6jt
Carter 76.3# 15.6#
Evaluation of Ford’s 
Handling of his Job
(1976)
ftppm* d l M B r a m
str. Dea 32# i#
weak Dob 42# 6#
ind. Dea 45# 11#
independ# 78# 15#
ind. Rep 91# 50#
weak Rep 89# 14#
str. Rep 2§S__ 64# __
# voting for 
Ford
StPttML Q
Evaluation of Carter's 
Hsndling of his job
(I960)
approve dtlgpprgYt
str. Den 97# 62#
weak Dea 79# 36#
ind. Dea 71# 37#
independ. 43# 2#
iadv Rap 42# 3#
weak Rep 42# 1#
str. Rep _ 0
# voting for 
Carter
e c t  on B of table 2 . 7  show:; t h a t  Ford way h e l d  accountable
QC
o a much greater extent than was Humphrey. In 1976. there 
as a difference of at least thirty p e r c e n t a g e  p o i n t y  betw een 
hose who approved and disapproved at every level of p a r t y  
lehtification. This is because in 1976. Ford was not just 
ccountable for the actions of his party. Ford was accountable 
ereonally. In I960. Jimmy Carter also had personal accountability, 
action C shows that there was a tremendous difference between 
hose who approved of Carter and those who d id  not.^ As section 
shows, once t h e  reason o f  Party identification was removed, 
i r t u a l l y  nobody who disapproved of Carter’s job as president 
• otetJ f o r  h i n . ^
Approval or disapproval over specific policies and issues 
is also often an extremely strong predictor of the vote. Table 
2 . 8 shows the relationship between the vote and Carter's handling 
of  specific problems. The correlation seems to be fairly 
f.trong. It Beems that issue voting in the form of retrospoctive 
evaluations of policies are a better predictor of the vote 
than are issues with no time frame, such as the ones presented 
in the previous section. This may be due to the element of 
personal accountability that is inherent in the retrospective 
evaluations.
The President o f  t h e  U n i te d  States not only must account for 
the job he does, he often bears the brunt of accountability 
f o r  the entire United States Government. To many people, the 
President is the embodiment of the entire government. Anything 
that goes wrong in government will be blamed on him. The 
performance rating for the Presidency and for the federal
TABLE 2.8
EVALUATION OP CARTER ON NON-ECONOMIC ISSUES
________________ AND THE VOTE______________________________
Section A
Evaluation of Cirttr'i Handling of the Hoataaa Crisis
strongly not strongly not strongly strMigly 
IMfffYt approve disapprove ll— PITYt
Roagan 15.8* 31.8% 47.0* 72.3*
Carter 81.8* 58.0* 36.55* 17.4*
Section B
Evaluation of Carter's handling of Afcaniatan
ilrvn* JMgt right not enough
Rtagan 51.1*  35»*** 66.3*
Carter 37.0* 53.*n* 24. 9*
Section C
Evaluation of Carter's Energy Policy
strongly n o t  s t r o n g l y  n o t  s t r o n g l y  strongly 
approve aaaay.fi.____ disapprove. fllfifiMgBYt
Reagan 13*75* 36.35* 56.0ft 70.6ft
________Carter 84.2* 52,2%__________ 35.***________ 16.5*
government shows that the two are rated similarly. The Gsmraa 
for the two was .61?® The result of this is that The President 
is held responsible for some things that he does not have 
complete control over. Most notable amongst these is the 
economy. *
The curcente&afe ef'the economic conditions, both of the 
individual voter and of the nation as a whole, is a very strong 
predictor of an individual's vote. People have a strong tendency
71
vote vote according to their pocketbook.
It is no secret that the economic indicators are always 
important around the time of an election. It is also no secret 
that the President must shoulder the blame when things go wrong. 
Cerald Ford complained that he had betfi .sabotaged by the Democratic 
congress in 1976. Richard Nixon had made the same claim in 
I960. By 1972 he had learned his lesson, and was manipulating 
the indicators himselfl®®
Manipulation of the economy has become regularized. Edward 
Tufte. in his book entitled Political Control of Economy, 
identifies what he calls the political business cycle. He 
states that short-run spurts of economic growth in th« months 
immediately preceding an election will benefit incumbents.
For this reason, incumbents will manipulate the location and 
timing of economic benefits. There are two identifiable 
symtoms to the political business cycle. Number one. there is 
a two-year cycle in the growth of real disposable income per 
capita, with accelerations in even numbered years and decelerations 
in odd-numbered years. Number two. there is a four-year cyclt. in
the unemployment rate, with downturns in the months before
101the presidential elections. J
On graph 2.1. on page 72. I have charted the year-to-year 
changes in the unemployment rate. Presidential election years 
are circled. It is quite apparent that presidential elections 
mostly occur in the valleys, not the peaks, of the chart. In 
I960, however, the unemployment rate was way up. Graph 2.2. 
on page 731 enlarges the section of graph 2^1 covering Jimpy 
Carter's term in office. Although the unemployment rate did start 
to come down in the months before the election, this was only
vm i  14 '18 'SO 3 6 7 6 9 10 !S 12 l» t4 tB 10 17 10'51 '54 'j# '10 '41 *4H K V  '70 U 71 If IHO
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after a year and a half long upward trend. Carter's Inability
to control tha unemployment rate, and othar aapacta of tha
economy, coat hin daarly in 1980.
Tha ralationahip batwaan tha vote and retrospective evaluations
of Jinny Cartar'a parformanca in dealing with tha aoonony ia
summarized in tabla 2.9» on paga 75* A glance at aaction A
nakaa it obvious that Cartar waa hald aocountabla for hia failura
to daal with unemployment}*^ Thara was a diffaranca of 65*558
in plurality for Cartar batwaan thoaa who strongly approvad of
hia handling of unemployment and thoaa who strongly diaapprovad.
Thara was an avan graatar reaction on the subject of inflation.
On this subject thara waa a difference of 78*2% from tha noat
104favorable category to tha least.
Earlier in tha paper, on paga 64, I presented evidence that
Cartar and Reagan ware close to equidistant fron the midpoint
of public opinion aa to whether unemployment of inflation should
be dealt with first. But, only eleven percent of tha nation
strongly approvad of Carter’s handling of unemployment, as
opposed to fourty four percent who strongly disapproved*
On tha subject of inflation, only seven porcent of tha public
strongly approvad, as opposed to fifty two percent who strongly
disapproved.*0^ As tabla 2.9 shows, there was an extremely high
correlation batwaan approval/disapproval ol‘ Carters handling of
these two natters and tha vote. Therefore, it seams vary likely
that those voting based on unaaployaant or inflation would have
voted overwhelmingly in favor of Reagan, despite tha fact that
Reagan hald no advantage in issue positon. This is a good
example of how retrospective evaluations ware more powerful than
issue positions in 1980, avan for those who vota based on issues.
TABLE 2.9
acmfcKOBPMC mitfAlttHa
section A
Evaluation* ot Carter's Handling of Unsaoloimt
strongly
approve
not strongly
approve___
not stronly
disapprove
strongly
disapprove
Reagan 12.2* 28.8* 59.6* 66.8*
Carter 87.8* 60.9* 29.6* 22.3*
Section B
Evaluations of Carter's Handling of Inflation
strongly
approve
not stronly 
approve
not strongly 
disapprove
strongly
fllBMMTCW
Reagan 3.7* 20.7* 48.1 * 70.4*
Carter 96.3* 71.9* 38.0* 18.1*
Soction C
Evaluation of Stato of tho Bconoav
better M B ! w o r n
Reagan 35.9* 26.5* 55.2*
Carter 48.7* 63.7* 35.2*
We have soon that rotroopootivo ovaluationo woro an extreaely 
strong predictor of the vote. This has been true for general 
evaluations, evaluations according to party identification, 
evaluations of policies on Iran, energy, uneaployaent. inflation, 
and the econony in general. Carter net with aore disapproval than 
approval on all of these subjects. This leaves us with a great 
deal of evidence to support the thesis that retrospective 
evaluations were the principal reason why Jiaay Carter was not 
reeloted in i960.
afcile i<iignrng for election in i960, T.enald Reagan node 
■•ny campaign preale**, and proposals. Yet, we have seen that 
those practises, and paaples evaluations of then, ware only a
ainor factor in tfce election. The irony is that those proaisea 
aade in 1980 could possibly be a larger factor in 1984, whether 
Reagan runs again or net. Accountability was the main factor 
in the 1980 election. Many people were unhappy. They were 
upset about Iran, the economy, and about many other things. In 
1980, as in Harry Truman's day, the buck still stopped in the 
oval office. Jimmy Carter was held accountable for the nation's 
problems, and the electorate's lack of satisfaction over the way 
he dealt with them.
If accountatdility was the main factor in the 1900 election, 
then Jimmy Carter, not Ronald Reagan, was the m o st  important 
man. We have seen that many people did not have an opinion on 
Reagan's proposal for a tax cut. Far fewer had no opinion on 
Carter's handling of Iran, or inflation. The people formed 
their opinions of Carter, and they v o t e d  baaed o r  them.
There were other factors in the 1980 e l e c t i o n  b e s i d e s  
r e t r o s p e c t i v e  e v a l u a t i o n s  of ferter, but for one reason or another 
none wore aa powerful. Party affiliation was still a factor. 
Despite the decline of s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  p a r t i e s ,  and t h e  rise 
of independents, party affiliation is still a potentially s t r o n g  
enough f a c t o r  t o  W i n g  an election by itself. But, the effect 
of party affiliation is direclty related to turnout. In a year 
when turnout was quite a bit higher than it was in I960, party
affiliation aim* night r i ’l ge a Don d  tic president elected*
The turnout simply was : ot present in 1 ?8C Tiers always eeene 
to he nor# crossover votes amorn st the th Demo 'Sts* Retrospective 
evaluations undoubtedly pulled even mere Cem;cri a over*
The decline of parties and the rise of retrospective 
voting are related* Independents are the nt st 1ikely to be 
retrospective voters* In that r e s p e c t ,  t o e  continuing decline 
of parties was important in 1980. With le:;s people than ever 
considering party identification as a major criteria* retroapective 
evaluations are bound to become more important*
It is far more difficult to vote prospectively than it is 
to vote retrospectively. After all* a prospective vote is based 
on a guess,of what the future will bring* A retrospective vote 
looks ahead to the future based on the certainty of past^experience* 
It is apparent that the rise in issue voting is also related to 
the rise of retrospective voting* Prospective issue voters 
must first guess what the issues will be* then guess which side 
will serve them better* A retrospective issue voter votes 
based on a certainty that his opinion on the issue did or did 
not coinoide with the actual policy of the incumbent. In a 
sence* retrospective voting is a more logical form of issue 
voting*
If issue voting was important in the 1980 election* in 
the form of retrospective evaluations of the issues* than Ronald 
Reagan had nothing to do with those issue choices* The form of 
the issue voting was approval or rejection of Jimmy Carter's 
policies* In an election where ratrespectiye issue voting was the 
important factor* and the incumbent was reelected* there would
be a clear mandate for hia to continuo hio policies. Th# defeat 
of tho incuabont in An oloction whoro retrospective evaluations 
wore soot InportAnt holds no suoh cloar message. Tho polioios 
of tho ineuabont wars unpopular. On* cannot say that this 
aoans that an isauo choice has been made in favor of tho challenger 
In the case of the 1980 election, there is no evidence to support 
a claim that the electorate responded to Ronald Reagan’s proposals, 
they only rejected Jimmy carter's efforts.
The 1980 election will not be remembered as the beginning 
of a new Republican era, unless many changes occur before 1984. 
There were no major coalitional shifts, no realignments. There *■ 
was no clear choice made, and no m andate  handed o u t .  Whet 
there was was a lack of s a t i s f a c t i o n  o v e r  t h e  way t h a t  one man 
handled hiw job. That man was fired.
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